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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
PROBLEMS OF PRECEDENT AFFECTING COURT OF CIVIL
APPEALS OPINIONS
Gordon Simpson* and Mary Kate Wall**
E ACH year the 11 courts of civil appeals in Texas write more
than 800 opinions. This output represents the work of 33
able and learned jurists, and is sufficient to fill several volumes
of books. Of what value are these opinions to the jurisprudence of
the state? This question is likely to occur each time a lawyer pre-
pares a brief, or advises a client, or adds a volume of reports to
his library. An inquiry into the relationship between the purposes
and functions of an intermediate appellate court and the court of
last resort may throw some light on the problem.
Subordinate appellate courts are established for the purpose
of relieving the court of last resort from an overburdening
docket.' To make effective the purpose of their creation, the
supreme court must not be required to spend too much time in
scrutinizing their work. As said in People v. Davis,2 requirement
of too minute a review would defeat the object which their crea-
tion was intended to secure. Every lawyer and practically every
client would like to have the supreme court decide his case; but
this would be an impossible thing, and clients and lawyers alike
must realize that "there is no abstract or inherent right in every
citizen to take every case to the highest court."8 Having accorded
the right of appeal essential to due process, the framers of the
* B.A., LL.B.; Vice President and General Counsel, General American Oil Company
of Texas, Dallas, Texas; Associate Justice, Texas Supreme Court, 1945-1949; Past
President, Texas State Bar.
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; Assistant Attorney General, State of Texas,
Austin, Texas.
1 In Betts v. Johnson, 96 Tex. 360, 363, 73 S.W. 4, 5 (1903), Chief Justice Gaines
said:
"Before the amendment of that article and the passage of the act [judicial reor-
ganization of 1891], the Supreme Court, with the aid of two commissions, had been
unable to dispose of the appeals which were brought to it. The purpose of the
amendment was to correct this evil by providing for a sufficient number of courts
of civil appeals to dispose of the business in the first instance."
2 147 Cal. 346, 349, 81 Pac. 718, 720 (1905). Cf. Ex parte Louisville & N. B. Co., 176
Ala. 631, 646, 58 So. 315, 320 (1912) (dissenting opinion).
8 People v. Davis, supra note 2 at 349, 81 Pac. at 720.
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judicial system must then concern themselves with regulating the
nature of the review in the court of last resort so as best to attain
its ultimate purpose-the establishment of precedent rulings.
When an appellate court's business accumulates faster than it
can be disposed of, several things can be done: the court can
be left in its plight, until eventually the entire appellate system
bogs down; or its work can be divided among coordinate courts;
or auxiliary bodies can be created to assist it; or its jurisdiction
can be restricted to a supervision of inferior courts brought into
existence to carry the main burden of deciding appeals for liti-
gants. The Supreme Court of Texas has experienced all of these
situations. It has gone through periods when it was submerged
in a deluge of accumulated work.' Fairly early in its history a part
of its jurisdiction was given to the coordinate Court of Appeals.5
At various times it has been assisted by commissioners and justices
of other courts.6 But its most significant relief was achieved by the
creation of intermediate appellate courts and the restriction of
its jurisdiction in the judicial reorganization of 1891.'
In this reorganization of the appellate system in 1891, the Court
of Appeals was replaced by the Court of Criminal Appeals, a
4 See Stayton and Kennedy, A Study of Pendency in Texas Civil Litigation, 21 Tex.
L Rev. 382, 392 (1943), for data on one such era, which was finally relieved by the
establishment of the Commission of Appeals in 1918.
5 TEX. CONST. (1876) Art. V, § 1, 6, 8; Tex. Laws 1876, c. 5. This court had appel-
late jurisdiction in all criminal cases, and in civil cases which could originate in courts
below the district court.
6 A commission of appeals was first created in 1879, and except for two years con-
tinued in existence until 1892. It was originally a "commission of arbitration and
award," whose opinions had no effect as precedent, for deciding cases submitted to it
upon consent of parties. Tex. Laws Spec. Sess. 1879, c. 34. In 1881 its powers were
enlarged to allow the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to refer any civil case
to it for the preparation of an opinion and synopsis "to facilitate them in reaching a
conclusion on the law and facts of the case." Tex. Laws 1881, c. 7; Tex. Laws 1883, c.
36. In 1887 it became an adjunct to the Supreme Court alone. Tex. Laws 1887, c. 95; Tex.
Laws 1889, c. 55; Tex. Laws 1891, c. 59. It was revived in 1918 and continued in exist-
ence until 1945, when the membership of the Supreme Court was increased from 3 to 9
members. Tex. Laws 4th Spec. Sess. 1918, c. 81, and acts in 1919, 1921, 1923 and 1925;
Tex. Laws 5th Spec. Seas. 1930, c. 2.
In 1917 and 1918, the Supreme Court was also assisted in passing on applications
for writ of error by a panel of court of civil appeals justices. Tex. Laws 1917, c. 76.
This statute is still in effect. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 1748.1754.
7 Amendments to Tex. Const. Art. V, §§ 1-6, adopted Aug. 11, 1891.
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forum exclusively for the review of criminal cases.' The reorgani-
zation also brought into existence the courts of civil appeals with
appellate jurisdiction over all civil cases.
The jurisdictional scheme put into effect immediately following
the constitutional amendment of 1891 was essentially that still
existing today As with the old Court of Appeals, the courts of
civil appeals were given final jurisdiction in certain civil cases,
but this important distinction was present: the Supreme Court had
certain revisory jurisdiction over these "final" decisions, which it
had not possessed over decisions of the Court of Appeals. And
more important still, in certain types of cases the decisions of the
courts of civil appeals were not final but could be reviewed by the
Supreme Court on application for writ of error. So it was that the
birth of the intermediate appellate system in Texas occurred in
1892 with the opening of the first three courts of civil appeals.
Since that date the judges, lawyers and legislators of the state
have been concerned with problems which grew out of this pyra-
miding of appellate jurisdiction, some of the most vital of which
revolve around the authoritativeness of the opinions of these inter-
mediate courts and may be called "problems of precedent."
PROBLEMS CONSIDERED
It is some of these problems of precedent which will be dis-
cussed in this paper. They may be stated as follows:
1. To what extent does the refusal by the court of last resort
to revise an intermediate court's opinion enhance or destroy its
value as a legal precedent?
2. What is the value of an unreviewed opinion of the inter-
mediate court as a legal precedent?
3. In the light of the answers to the first two questions, what
opinions of intermediate courts should be published?
8 Texas and Oklahoma are the only states having separate appellate courts for
criminal business. Although other state courts mentioned herein exercise criminal as
well as civil jurisdiction, this paper is limited to a discussion of civil jurisdiction only.
9 Tex. Laws Spec. Sess. 1892, c. 14 and c. 15.
[Vol. 4
PROBLEMS OF PRECEDENT
Underlying these problems is the question of the extent to
which the supreme court should be under a duty to indicate the
correctness of legal principles announced in opinions written by
the intermediate courts. The solution of this question must of
necessity result in a compromise between certainty and expedi-
ency. Certainty in the principles of law, by placing an authorita-
tiveness on every opinion supporting a judgment of an inter-
mediate court, is doubtlessly desirable; but the same expediency
which necessitates the existence of intermediate appellate courts
demands that the highest tribunal be relieved of the duty of assur-
ing a correct expression of these principles in a substantial num-
ber of the opinions written by the intermediate court.
PROPOSALS AFFECTING THESE PROBLEMS
These matters have been put before the bar of Texas recently
in the form of two proposals. The first is a resolution adopted by
the State Bar of Texas at its 1949 meeting, calling upon the
Supreme Court to amend Rule 483 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure to require the Supreme Court to indicate "by an appro-
priate memorandum the particular part of the opinion of the Court
of Civil Appeals which is not approved" whenever it denies an
application for writ of error with the notation "Refused. No
Reversible Error."'"
The second proposal is a resolution adopted by the Texas Civil
Judicial Council proposing an amendment of Rule 452 aimed at
reducing the number of opinions written by the courts of civil
appeals, curtailing the number of opinions which are published in
the law reports, and denuding unpublished opinions of any stand-
ing as precedents."
At first glance this second proposal might seem to be counter
to the State Bar resolution, the latter seeking to enlarge the body
10 12 Tex. Bar Jour. 368 (1949). At the Supreme Court's last biennial conference
on amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, in April, 1949, the rules advisory com-
mittee rejected a similar proposal.
11 21 Tex. Civ. Jud. Council Rep. 37, 52 (1949).
1950]
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of opinions which should be published, i. e., those having prece-
dential value, and the other seeking to curtail publication. How-
ever, the Texas Civil Judicial Council's resolution is aimed not
so much at a numerical reduction as at an elimination of those
opinions which are of no importance as precedents.
The resolution of the State Bar attempts to secure the Supreme
Court's express approval of portions of the court of civil appeals
opinions in these "NRE" cases by the indirection of requiring
the court to point out all disapproved portions, and by thus sepa-
rating the wheat from the chaff to increase the stature of these
approved portions as precedents. Fundamentally the object seems
to be to have an authoritative expression by the Supreme Court
on all points of law discussed by the courts of civil appeals in all
cases where applications for writ of error are filed.
Some seem to regard the "NRE" notation as a curse placed
upon court of civil appeals opinions. They say that it deprives the
opinion of any worth as a citation in support of the legal prin-
ciples announced in it, arguing that the Supreme Court evidently
disapproved of some portion of the opinion since it did not use
the unqualified "Refused" notation, and that the whole opinion
becomes worthless since it is impossible to tell what specific por-
tion the court does not agree with.
Let us see just what is the meaning and effect of the "NRE"
notation. This stamp, which was first used in 1945, means essen-
tially the same as the following notations of past years:12
1892-1927 Refused
1927-1939 Dismissed (also meant lack of jurisdiction)
1939-1941 Dismissed-Correct Judgment
1941-1945 Refused for Want of Merit
Generally speaking, the notation signifies neither approval nor
disapproval of the holdings expressed in the court of civil appeals
opinion. Rule 483 itself defines the meaning of the notation: "In
all cases where the Supreme Court is not satisfied that the opinion




of the Court of Civil Appeals in all respects has correctly declared
the law, but is of the opinion that the application presents no
error which requires reversal, the Court will deny the applica-
tion, with the notation 'Refused. No Reversible Error'." While
ordinarily indicating that the Supreme Court approves the judg-
ment of the court of civil appeals, the "NRE" stamp signifies ex-
press approval of the reasoning in the opinion only to the extent
that a particular holding necessary to the judgment--such that the
judgment could have been rendered on no other view of the
matter-is attacked by proper assignment in the Supreme Court.18
But it does not follow that the notation denotes disapproval of any
of the holdings. The language of Rule 483 is not the equivalent of
saying that the Supreme Court is satisfied that the court of civil
appeals opinion has not correctly declared the law.
While it is natural for every lawyer to want the Supreme Court
to write on all of his cases, this object is necessarily inconsistent
with the purpose for which the courts of civil appeals were estab-
lished. As has been pointed out, a litigant has no inherent right
to have the court of last resort pass on his case. Justification for a
demand for an expression by the Supreme Court must be based
upon a need for establishing precedent, and not upon the litigant's
desire to have an opinion by the Supreme Court in his individual
case.
BURDEN ON THE SUPREME COURT
The questions immediately brought to mind by this proposal
are, first, would this be placing too great a burden on the Supreme
Court, and second, is our jurisprudence suffering by the use of the
"NRE" stamp under the present practice? The answer to both
questions must be framed in the light of the history and present
functioning of our appellate system.
During the year 1949 the Supreme Court considered 478 appli-
cations for writ of error. To require the writing of a memorandum
opinion on each of the 272 applications which were marked
18 Conley v. Abrams, 7 S.W. 2d 674, 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) er. ref.
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"Refused. No Reversible Error" would increase the court's bur-
den enormously. True enough, the proposed rule would require
only that the Supreme Court "indicate" the particular part of the
court of civil appeals' opinion which is not approved. What
amount of work would this entail?
In the first place, it must be remembered that the Supreme
Court is taking action on an application for writ of error, not on
the court of civil appeals opinion. While it naturally also weighs
the portions of the opinion which are involved in the points of
error, its focus is not on the court of civil appeals opinion as a
whole but on the portions under attack. Rule 451 requires the
courts of civil appeals to announce in writing their conclusions on
all issues presented to them. Consequently, the opinion may in-
clude a great many rulings which are not questioned in the
Supreme Court. To require the Supreme Court to point out every
portion of the opinion of which it does not approve would put on
it the task of going outside the application to determine the cor-
rect rule of law, whether error was assigned or not. This process
would not only be burdensome but would require the court to pass
on matters beyond its jurisdiction, since the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction of assigned errors only.' 4
In the second place, the mere pointing out of an unapproved
portion would be worse than meaningless without a statement of
the reasons for the Supreme Court's disapproval. Such a practice
might result in positive mischief by casting doubt on established
principles of law where the court of civil appeals' statement was
partially correct but not entirely so. It seems inescapable that, in
order to realize any value from such a system, the Supreme Court
would have to write an opinion rather than a simple memorandum.
The amount of time required to frame a judicial opinion will not
be underestimated by those who have had experience in this field.
The preparation of a carefully presented appellate brief, difficult
as it may be, is usually much less exacting work than the prepara-
14 Moore v. Dilworth, 142 Tex. 538, 179 S. W. 2d 940 (1944). See remarks of Chief
Justice Hickman in 12 Tex. Bar Jour. 339, 340 (1949).
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tion of a judicial opinion, which should be painstakingly correct
and precise 'in its language as well as its content.
Even where the Supreme Court might reach identical conclu-
sions on all the questions discussed, the process of determining
that the court of civil appeals has reached the correct result is
much simpler than evaluating each sentence of its opinion as a
completely accurate expression of the principles involved.
With these increased demands on the court's time, it seems
inevitable that the result would be a recurrence of the days when
cases remained on the docket for years, awaiting action by a court
so overloaded with work that it could not dispatch its business.
Is OUR JURISPRUDENCE SUFFERING?
We come next to inquire whether the jurisprudence of the state
is being emaciated by the use of the "NRE" notation, and whether
it is in a more unfavorable condition than that of other states with
intermediate appellate courts.
As a preliminary observation, it should be remembered that
prior to 1927 no notation used on applications for writ of error
signified a greater degree of approval of the reasoning in the court
of civil appeals opinions than does the "NRE" stamp at the pres-
ent time. Since 1927 the Supreme Court has been empowered to
signify express approval of the court of civil appeals opinion by
using the notation "Refused" on the application, 5 but it has never
been required to write any kind of memorandum opinion on appli-
cations which it denied or to give any reason for the denial other
than that implied in the notation used.
In a divided appellate system, the chief function of the court
of last resort usually is to establish precedents. It may also per-
form the function of securing a correct decision of the particular
case, but its primary concern is not for the individual litigants."s
15 Tex. Laws 1927, c. 144; TEx. RULES CIV. PRoc. Rule 483.
16 In some instances the courts of last resort do act primarily for the protection
of the individual litigant's rights. This seems to be true in New York where appeals of
right are allowed in cases reversed by the intermediate appellate court. See Table 2,
intra.
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This interest in the welfare of the general jurisprudence is
exemplified in the following language by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court:
"The authority of the justices of the Supreme Court to allow special
appeals [from the subordinate court] is not limited, but it is apparent,
from the general scheme of the act, that it is intended to be exceptional,
and based on considerations other than the mere desire or interest of the
particular parties. The most obvious of such considerations are the
bearings of the question on public interest or rights, the importance of
the decision as a precedent in frequently occurring litigation, diversity
of opinion in other courts, and consequent desirability of a final deter-
mination, and, generally, the preservation of uniformity in the applica-
tion of legal principles."' 17
Under the pattern prescribed by our constitution, the legis-
lature has divided the appellate jurisdiction so that the courts of
civil appeals have final jurisdiction in certain types of cases and
intermediate jurisdiction in others. The Supreme Court's revisory
power over cases within the final jurisdiction of the courts of civil
appeals-which must rest either on conflict of decisions or on dis-
sent-is based exclusively on the first function.
17 Kraemer v. Guarantee Trust & Safe-Deposit Co., 173 Pa. 416, 418, 33 Ati. 1047,
1048 (1896). Ct. Chief Justice Vinson's statement in Work of the U. S. Supreme Court,
12 Tex. Bar Jour. 551, 552 (1949). In part the Chief Justice said:
"The Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with
the correction of errors in lower court decisions. In almost all cases within the
Court's appellate jurisdiction, the petitioner has already received one appellate
review of his case. The debates in the Constitutional Convention make clear that
the purpose of the establishment of one supreme national tribunal was, in the
words of John Rutledge of South Carolina, 'to secure the national rights & uni-
formity of Judgments.'
"The function of the Supreme Court is, therefore, to resolve conflicts of opinion
on federal questions that have arisen among lower courts, to pass upon questions
of wide import under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States,
and to exercise supervisory power over lower federal courts. If we took every
case in which an interesting legal question is raised, or our prima facie impres-
sion is that the decision below is erroneous, we could not fulfill the Constitutional
and statutory responsibilities placed upon the Court.
"To remain effective, the Supreme Court must continue to decide only those
cases which present questions whose resolution will have immediate importance
far beyond the particular facts and parties involved. Those of you whose petitions
for certiorari are granted by the Supreme Court will know, therefore, that you
are, in a sense, prosecuting or defending class actions; that you represent not
only your clients, but tremendously important principles, upon which are based
the plans, hopes, and aspirations of a great many people throughout the country."
PROBLEMS OF PRECEDENT
It is the intermediate jurisdiction of the courts of civil appeals
which affords the basis of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by
writ of error. Article 1728 of the TEXAS REVISED CIVIL STATUTES
lists six types of cases in which the Supreme Court may entertain
a writ of error: (1) dissent in the court of civil appeals; (2) con-
flict of decisions; (3) construction or validity of statutes; (4)
revenues of the State; (5) Railroad Commission a party; (6)
error of substantive law affecting the judgment of the court of
civil appeals.
What function is the Supreme Court performing in passing on
these cases? The rationale of the first five classifications would
appear to be the importance--a priori-of these types of cases
because of their general interest to the jurisprudence from the
standpoint of establishing precedent and preserving uniformity.
The primary objective behind them is the enunciation of general
principles of law-although correct decision of the particular case
would also follow. The explanation for selecting them seems to lie
in the fact that by their very nature cases falling within these cate-
gories are considered of such importance that they should be
cognizable by the court of last resort, whose ultimate duty it is
to fix the precedents for subsequent decisions."8
But subdivision 6 is founded upon different considerations.
The language of this subdivision, stating in effect that there must
exist an error of substantive law which caused the rendition of an
improper judgment, indicates that the concern is not for precedent,
but for according justice in the specific case. Here the legislature
had in mind the Supreme Court's second function, namely, to in-
sure a correct judgment in the particular case because of its
importance to the litigants.19 This is especially true where the
18 This function was minimized in the Supreme Court's practice, from 1918 to 1934,
of adopting judgments of the Commission of Appeals without approving its holdings.
See Lattimore, Decisions of the Commission of Appeals as Authority, 4 Tex. L. Rev.
335 (1926) and Note, 12 Tex. L. Rev. 356 (1934).
19 Under the statute as it existed between 1917 and 1927, subdivision 6 also empha-
sized the first of these functions. Tex. Laws 1917, c. 75. It read:
"In any other case in which it is made to appear that an error of law has been
committed by the Court of Civil Appeals of such importance to the jurisprudence
1950]
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amount in controversy is the only characteristic which takes the
case out of the final jurisdiction of the court of civil appeals.
Subdivision 6 also includes cases involving title to real prop-
erty, probate matters, contested election of a state officer, and a
few other subjects which by their subject matter, as distinguished
from the amount in controversy, fall within the potential writ of
error jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.2" The legislature evi-
dently deemed these subjects of more importance, either to the
litigants or the general welfare or both, than slander, divorce,
and other election contests. Possibly the legislature had in mind
the desirability of securing precedents as well as a correct judg-
ment in at least some of these categories.
These observations raise the question whether the Supreme
Court should grant a writ of error under the first five subdivisions
of Article 1728 for the purpose of clarifying principles of law
where it is of the opinion that the court of civil appeals has
rendered a correct judgment. Parenthetically, the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction even under subdivision 6, based on an error
of substantive law affecting the judgment, does not actually depend
upon the existence of an erroneous judgment. If it did, the
Supreme Court could not affirm a judgment of the court of civil
appeals but would be obliged to dismiss the writ after its delibera-
tion and conclusion that the judgment was correct. If erroneous
judgment were a jurisdictional matter the proper order in deny-
of the State, as in the opinion of the Supreme Court requires correction, but
excluding those cases in which the jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals is
made final by Statute. Upon the showing of such an error the Supreme Court may,
in its discretion, grant a writ of error for the purpose of revising the decision upon
such question alone.. .."
If the Supreme Court did not consider the case of importance, it dismissed the writ
for want of jurisdiction without passing on the correctness of the judgment. See
Decker v. Kerlicks, 110 Tex. 90, 95, 216 S.W. 385, 386 (1919) ; National Compress Co.
v. Hamlin, 114 Tex. 375, 385, 269 S.W. 1024, 1028 (1925).
20 TEX. CONST. Art. V, § 8; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1821. The dis-
trict court has exclusive original jurisdiction over forfeitures and escheats, divorce, title
to land and enforcement of liens thereon, slander and defamation, contested elections,
right of property levied on over $500, general control over executors and administrators,
guardians and minors, and original jurisdiction over all causes of action for which a
remedy or jurisdiction is not provided by law. Article 1821 makes the appellate jurisdic.
tion of the court of civil appeals final in, divorce, slander, and contested elections other
than for state officers.
[Vol. 4
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ing an application would be "Dismissed" rather than "Refused"
or "Refused. No Reversible Error."
Adverting to the first five subdivisions of Article 1728, under
the present wording of the statute l is it contemplated that the
Supreme Court shall settle all matters of dissent, conflict, etc.,
even though the judgment of the court of civil appeals is correct
or, indeed, even though the holdings are correctly stated? It has
never been the practice of the Supreme Court, either prior to or
since 1927 when it was first empowered to give express approval
to holdings of law in court of civil appeals opinions, to grant writs
of error in all cases coming within all of these subdivisions." But
perhaps it is not a far-fetched notion to say that the legislature
intended for the Supreme Court to declare the correct rules of law
within these five subdivisions in all cases, either by granting the
application or by giving it an unqualified refusal. This interpreta-
tion of legislative intent appears to be borne out in regard to sub-
division 2 in the provision, added in 1927, reading:
"Provided further that in cases of conflict named in Subdivision 2
above, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, refuse the writ of
error where the court is in agreement with the decision of the Court
of Civil Appeals in the case in which the application is filed; and in
cases of such conflict with a previous opinion of the Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court may, in its discretion, without the necessity of granting
the writ and hearing the case, reverse and remand the same on the
application for writ of error. 2
This interpretation would comport with the view that the first
21 The language has undergone several changes. The first enactment in 1892 pro-
vided that the Supreme Court should grant the writ if it appeared that there was error
in the judgment. Tex. Laws Spec. Sess. 1892, c. 14. The language of the 1913 statute
seemed to contemplate the granting of a writ in all cases of conflict, and in cases within
subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 if there was an erroneous holding. Tex. Laws 1913, c. 55. The
seemingly mandatory language of the 1913 statute was omitted from the 1917 act. Tex.
Laws 1917, c. 75.
.2 C. Terrell v. Middleton, 108 Tex. 14, 191 S.W. 1138 (1917) (concurring opinion
on order refusing writ of error).
23 Tex. Laws 1927, c. 144, now a part of Rule 483, TEX. RULES CIV. PROC. But the
statute allowing the Supreme Court to designate justices of the courts of civil appeals
to assist in passing on applications for writ of error (Tex. Laws 1917, c. 76, TEX. REv.
CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1752) apparently did not contemplate the granting
of writs in all cases within these subdivisions.
1950]
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five subdivisions were selected on the basis of their importance to
the general jurisprudence rather than to the specific parties to the
suit. In conflicts and dissents, the Supreme Court may be obligated
to settle the disputed questions when they arise in cases within
the final jurisdiction of the court of civil appeals.2" It is not unrea-
sonable to think that the court was expected to do as much when
these disagreements occur in cases not within the final jurisdic-
tion of the court of civil appeals. As to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5,
various arguments might be made both for and against the con-
clusion we have advanced, and there is no way of knowing
definitely just what motivated the selection of these categories.25 '
However that may be, the following conclusions certainly
appear justifiable:
1. Where the case comes within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court only because of its importance to the litigants (generally
speaking, most cases within subdivision 6), the court should not
be required to do more than to pass on whether the judgment is
or is not correct on the basis of the assignments presented in the
application. That is exactly what the present "NRE" practice is
designed to do.
2. Where the case comes within the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion because of its general importance to the jurisprudence of the
state (cases within part or all of subdivisions 1 to 5), the court
might reasonably be required to indicate its views on all questions
referable to the matter which is endowed with this jurispruden-
tial importance-but not necessarily on every other matter raised
24 In cases which cannot reach the Supreme Court by writ of error, the court of
civil appeals may certify questions of conflict and dissent, under Rules 462, 463 and
465, T.x. RULES CIV. Paoc.; or the Supreme Court may answer the question in a
mandamus proceeding to compel certification, under Rule 475. The Supreme Court will
not decide certified questions in cases which can lawfully reach it on writ of error.
Rule 461, TEx. RULES Civ. Pnoc.; Duval v. Clark, 137 Tex. 186, 157 S.W. 2d 626 (1942).
25 When subdivision 5 (Railroad Commission a party) was first included, the Rail-
road Commission's functions were confined to regulating rates of railroads, express
companies, and docks and wharves. Tex. Laws 1891, c. 51, c. 45, and c. 104. This was
a new field of regulation in Texas at that time, and litigation involving the Railroad
Commission was doubtlessly thought likely to affect the public and the railroad indus-
try generally. With the expansion of the Commission's fields of regulation through the
years, much of its litigation is now primarily of interest to the litigants alone.
[Vol. 4
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in the opinion. For this purpose the device of a memorandum
accompanying the marking of an application with the notation
"Refused. No Reversible Error" might be a convenient and
expeditious one. But to accomplish its purpose the memorandum
opinion should assume a positive aspect by pointing out correct
rulings, rather than negatively pointing out erroneous ones.
Further on we will attempt to determine the extent to which
the Supreme Court is performing these two functions. But first
let us see what the practices are in other states having intermedi-
ate appellate courts, in an effort to determine whether our Supreme
Court is falling short of the duties imposed on their courts of last
resort.
PRACTICE IN OTHER STATES
Twelve other states have added to their judicial systems one
or more intermediate appellate courts which regularly write opin-
ions in causes decided by them. 6 The division of appellate power
in Texas is considerably different from that obtaining in most
of these states. The majority of the states allocate the appellate
jurisdiction in such a way that certain appeals go directly to the
supreme court and others to the intermediate court. In Texas, New
Jersey, New York and Ohio, however, the court of last resort has
no major direct appellate jurisdiction.
26 The following table shows the state intermediate appellate courts now in exist-
ence. The number represents the number of independent bodies, whether designated
officially as separate courts or as divisions of the same court. Number ol
State Name of Court Courts
Alabama-Court of Appeals I..1
California-District Court of Appeal . --.. .. . .. 7
Georgia-Court of Appeals ..- ------. . .. .. ... 2
Illinois--Appellate Court - --------- 6
Indiana-Appellate Court --------. . 2
Louisiana-Court of Appeals . .... 3
M issouri- Court of Appeals------ -------.. - - -.- ----.-..........................------ - - 3......... 
New Jersey-Superior Court, Appellate Division ----........ .. . .. 2
New York-Supreme Court, Appellate Division 4
Ohio-Court of Appeals --- . . . . . . .. . .. ... 9
Pennsylvania-Superior Court - 1
Tennessee-Court of Appeals. . 3
Texas--Court of Civil Appeals --.. .. .. .. . ........... ....... 11
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Revisory power of the court of last resort over the decisions of
the intermediate court varies. The intermediate courts of most of
the states could be more accurately characterized as inferior or
subordinate courts of what might be termed conditional-final juris-
diction, the revisory power of the highest court being conditioned
upon a need for settling precedent and preserving uniformity of
decisions.2" In other words, they correspond to our courts of civil
appeals when acting within the field of their final jurisdiction.
In the following tables we have endeavored to present graph-
ically the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of last resort in the
thirteen states which have intermediate appellate systems. Certain
omissions of detail, and also certain liberties in treatment, have
been indulged in order to avoid cumbersomeness as far as pos-
sible, but broadly speaking the table gives a correct statement of
jurisdictional grounds as we have interpreted the constitution,
statutes, rules and decisions of the particular state. The following
symbols have been used:
D-direct appeal to the supreme court.
I-review by the supreme court after appeal to the intermediate court,
the supreme court having a certain discretion as to whether
review is granted.
IR-review of right in the supreme court after decision in the interme-
diate court.
27 Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Yesbik, 146 Ga. 620, 91 S.E. 783 (1917) ; State ex rel.
Miles v. Ellison, 269 Mo. 151, 190 S.W. 274 (1916).
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TABLE 1
Jurisdictional grounds for review
by supreme courtu A Z- :0a ,
1. Parties
Railroad Commission .......
State .................... D D
Certain public officers ....... D D
II. Subject matter
Construction of constitution D D D D I R IR IR D
Validity of statute .......... I D D D D DI
Validity of municipal
ordinance ................ D D D
Construction of statute ...... I
Federal question ........... D IR
Legality of tax ............. D D
State revenue .............. D D D I
Workmen's compensation .... DD
Title to real property ....... D D D D D D I
Possession of real property... D D D




drains, etc .............. D
Probate matters ............ D I
Validity or construction
of wills .................. D I
Equity eases .............. D D D D
Divorce, alimony ........... D D
Annulment of marriage ...... D I
Guardianship, etc ........... D I
Title to office .............. D D D
Contested election of officer.. D ISO
Certain writs .............. D D D D
Isolated grounds ........... D D D D D I&D
III. Amount In controversy
Over certain sum ........... D Ds D D I
$1000 $2000 $7500 $2500 $1000
IV. Treatment or outcome In
Intermediate court
(See Table 2.)
28 Original jurisdiction by mandamus, etc., against administrative boards and officers,
which sometimes takes the place of appeal or other forms of review, has not been in-
cluded. The constitutional and statutory provisions supporting the jurisdictional grounds
here shown are as follows: Alabama: ALA. ConE (1940) tit. 7, §§ 754, 755, 757, 759,
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In studying this table we observe a similarity of pattern, though
by no means a uniformity, in the types of cases which are expressly
reserved for the court of last resort. Each state has arrived at its
own particular set of cases which it wants its supreme court to be
directly responsible for; 2 but we may assume that each state has
been motivated by the same purpose, that is, what seemed most
important either to the general jurisprudence or to the litigants.
The volume of appellate business is also an important factor. In
the balance of the cases, the supreme court generally passes only
on those necessary to preserve a uniformity of decision of import-
ance to the jurisprudence of the state. Grounds for review of cases
appealed to the intermediate courts, based on the treatment or out-
come in the intermediate court, are shown in Table 2.88
760, 761, 775, 789; tit. 13, §§ 17, 85, 86, 98, 100, 102. California: CAL. CONST. Art. VI,
§ 4. Georgia: GA. CONST. ART. VI, § II,1 IV. Illinois: ILL. Bay. STAT. (1947) c. 110, § 199
(CIV. PRACTICE ACT § 75). Indiana: IND. STAT. (Baldwin, 1934) § 1356; cf. 1346 and
1355. Louisiana: LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10. Missouri: MO. CONST. Art V, § 3. New Jersey:
N. J. CONST. Art. VI, § V, ff 1. New York: N. Y. CONST. Art. VI, § 7; CIV. PRAc. ACT § 588
(Thompson's Laws, 1939; amended in part, Thompson's Laws, 1944 Supplement). Ohio:
OHIO CONST. Art. IV, § 2. Pensylvania: PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 17, §§ 41, 43, 182,
184, 190. Tennessee: TENN. CODE (1932) § 10618. Texas: TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon,
1948); cf. art. 1821.
29 Review of these decisions is discretionary. ILL. REy. STAT. (1947) c. 148, §
172.19.
80 Jurisdiction is limited to review of contested elections of state officers, unless the
validity of a statute is questioned by the decision.
31 Personal injury suits are excepted.
82 In Tennessee, for example, workmen's compensation cases are appealable directly
to the supreme court (see Table 1), while in Indiana they are final in the intermediate
court, regardless of an erroneous ruling on a new question of law or conflict with a
supreme court decision. Kingan & Co. v. Ossam, 190 Ind. 554, 131 N.E. 81 (1921).
83 Alabama: ALA. CODE (1940) tit. 13, §§ 87, 88, 100; Ex parte Louisville & N. R.
Co., 176 Ala. 631, 58 So. 315 (1912) ; see Rule 44, RULEs OF S. CT. OF ALA., ALA. CODE
(1940), p. 1021, amended in part, 1947 Supp. p. 115. California: CAL. CONST. Art. VI,
§§ 4, 4c; RULES ON APPEAL, Rule 29, 22 Cal. 2d 36. Georgia: GA. CONST. Art. VI, § II,
r IV and fT VIII; Rule 52, RULES OF S. CT. OF GA., 202 Ga. 890. Illinois: ILL. REV.
STAT. (1947) c. 110, § 199; see Rule 32, ILL. RULES OF PRAC. AND PROC. Indiana: IND.
STAT. (Baldwin, 1934) §§ 1359, 1364. Louisiana: LA. CONST. Art VII, §§ 11, 25. Missouri:
Mo. CONST. ART. V, § 10; Rule 2.06, Mo. S. CT. RULES, 357 Mo. viii. New Jersey: N. J.
CONST. Art VI, § V, 1 1. New York: N. Y. CONST. Art VI, § 7. Ohio: OHIO CoNsT. Art
IV, §§ 2, 6. Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 17, §§ 190, 197; Kraemer v.
Guarantee Trust & Safe-Deposit Co., 173 Pa. 416, 33 At. 1047 (1896) ; Taylor v. Phila-
delphia Rapid Transit Co., 245 Pa. 189, 91 At. 631 (1914). Tennessee: TENN. CODE
(Williams, 1934) § 10629; see Beard v. Beard, 158 Tenn. 437, 438, 14 S.W. 2d 745
(1929). Texas: TEx. Ray. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1728; Rules 461, 462, 463, 476,





Alabama Conflict with decision of supreme
court; validity of statute; disqualifi-
cation of intermediate court judges;
errors of law in certain instances.
California Conflict of decision; dissent; settle-
ment of important questions of law;
disqualification of intermediate court
judges.
Georgia Error in intermediate court in cases
of public concern and in matters of
importance (e.g., revenue, construc-
tion of statutes, public officers, con-
flict of decision).
Illinois May grant in any case; no grounds
specified. If in contract or in dam-
ages, amount involved must be over
$1500.
Indiana s 4  Conflict with decision of supreme
court; new question of law directly
involved was erroneously decided;
failure of requisite number of judges
to concur.
Louisiana Conflict of decision and questions of
public importance.
Missouri General interest or importance of
question involved; existing law er-
roneous; conflict with decision of su-
preme court.
New Jersey Dissent; transfer by order of supreme
court.
New York Review of right where dissent, judg-
ment of reversal or modification, or
certain judgments of remand in inter-
mediate court. Discretionary review
where court thinks it should review
"in the interest of substantial jus-
tice."
Ohio Cases which it deems to be of public
or great general interest.
Pennsylvania Cases of great importance; conflict
of decision and preservation of uni-
formity.
Tennessee Errors of law; errors of fact where
reversal in intermediate court.
Texas Dissent; conflict of decision.
Review on motion ol
intermediate court
Dissent in intermediate court;
invalidity of statute.
Any question certified by inter-
mediate court; failure of requi-
site number of judges to concur.
Case of such importance that it
should be passed on by supreme
court.
Where two judges of interme-
diate court are of opinion that
ruling precedent of supreme
court is erroneous.
Any question of law on which
it desires instruction.
Decision contrary to previous
decision of an intermediate
court or of supreme court, where
a dissenting judge so certifies;
general interest or importance
of question; re-examination of
existing law.
Question of law involved which
ought to be reviewed by high-
est court.
Conflict of decision.
Questions involved so difficult
or important that supreme court
should decide.
Certification of conflicts, dis-
sents, and questions of law in




Where there is an appeal of right to the supreme court, either
directly or through the intermediate court, the supreme court nec-
essarily passes on all cases falling within the classifications afford-
ing appeal. Where no appeal of right exists, the court of last resort
in most states reviews only selected cases which present matters
of importance to the jurisprudence. 5 When the court refuses to
review a case, it is simply refusing to take jurisdiction rather than
passing on the merits. In other words, it is doing the same thing
the Supreme Court of Texas does in dismissing a writ of error for
want of jurisdiction. There is no in-between group of cases in
which the court is required to determine the correctness of judg-
ments rendered by the intermediate court. The Supreme Court of
Texas does exercise this function of insuring correct judgments in
a great bulk of cases, and that is perhaps the most important dis-
tinguishing feature of Texas' system.
Do other supreme courts indicate whether the intermediate court
has correctly stated the law in the cases which they refuse to re-
view? As would be expected from the fact that a refusal to review
is usually equivalent to a refusal to take jurisdiction, the general
rule is that a denial of review is not to be taken as an expression
on the merits of the case. In no state is there a positive requirement
that the supreme court write an opinion or otherwise indicate the
reasons for its action.36 In a few states the supreme court does occa-
sionally write a memorandum opinion, but it is not obliged to do
so. In instances where memorandum opinions are written, they
generally deal with practice points arising on the application and
indicate nothing as to the merits of the questions involved, al-
though in Alabama and Louisiana the supreme court's memo-
34 An alternative method of review provides that any case may be certified to the
supreme court from the trial court on a question of law decisive of the correctness or
erroneousness of the judgment. Ind. Laws 1937, c. 76.
35 Concern for precedent rather than for correct judgment in the particular case is
demonstrated in the holdings of various states that the supreme court can consider only
the opinion of the intermediate court, not the record, to determine whether the reasons
assigned as ground for review are sustained. People v. Davis, supra note 2 at 350, 81
Pac. at 719; Julian v. Bliss, 196 Ind. 68, 147 N.E. 148 (1925).
36 Information on the practice of the various states was obtained in part from let-
ters written by the clerks of the courts in response to an inquiry on the matter.
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randum may approve the judgment or the holdings of the inter-
mediate court.
Let us see more fully what the supreme court's denial of a re-
view means in each of these states, and to what extent it affects
the intermediate court's opinion as a precedent.
In Alabama a denial of review does not always indicate approval
of the lower court's judgment. Where the judgment is approved,
it does not mean that the supreme court approves all that was said
in the opinion not necessary to the result. 7
The Supreme Court of California announced its policy soon
after the establishment of intermediate courts in that state, in
People v. Davis:"8
"It is proper to add that the denial in any case of an application for
the transfer of a case decided by a district court of appeal is not to be
taken as an expression of any opinion by this court, or as the equivalent
thereof, in regard to any matter of law involved in the case and not
stated in the opinion of that court, nor, indeed, as an affirmative ap-
proval by this court of the propositions of law laid down in such
opinion.. .. It will not hold itself bound, even where questions of law
alone are involved, to order a transfer of the cause, after a decision of
the district court, except where it shall appear necessary in order to
carry out the above-stated purposes of securing uniformity of decision
and the settlement of important questions of law. The significance of
such refusal is no greater than this-that this court does not consider
that the interests of justice, or the purposes for which the power was
given, require its exercise in the particular case."
A rule of the Supreme Court of Georgia succinctly states the
effect of a denial of review: "The denial of a writ of certiorari
shall not be taken as an adjudication that the decision or judgment
of the Court of Appeals is correct." 9
The significance which appears to be given to a refusal to review
'3 Law v. State, 238 Ala. 428, 191 So. 803 (1939). But cf. Waller v. State, 32 Ala.
App. 586, 28 So. 2d 815 (1947).
38 147 Cal. 346, 350, 81 Pac. 718, 720 (1905), followed in Western Lithograph Co.
v. State Board of Equalization, 11 Cal. 2d 156, 78 P. 2d 731, 117 A.L.R. 838 (1938).
But see Bridges v. Tefft, 53 Cal. App. 117, 200 Pac. 71 (1921) ; People v. Rowland,
19 Cal. App. 2d 540, 65 P. 2d 1333 (1937).
39 Rule 54, RULES OF S. CT. OF GA., 202 Ga. 901.
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in Illinois at the present time was stated in People v. Grant.40 In
comparing the Illinois practice with that of the Supreme Court of
the United States, the court said that by denying a writ of certiorari
the Illinois Supreme Court does not review the judgment of the
appellate court, but declines to do so. A denial of review is not
equivalent to a holding that the judgment is correct or that the
questions of law have been properly decided.
We have observed that the Louisiana Supreme Court sometimes
writes a memorandum giving its reasons for denial of review. The
practice of the court appears to be rather flexible, and the notation
may even indicate in some instances that there is no error in the
ruling complained of. However, a refusal to review on the ground
that the judgment is correct is not necessarily an affirmance of all
that is said in the opinion of the lower court. 1 But it has been said
that where only one question is involved, the refusal of a writ
signifies the court's approval of the decision.42
The denial of leave to appeal in New York is equivalent to a
refusal to take jurisdiction of the cause, and does not have the
force of an affirmance. In Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co. 4
the court stated the effect of its action on the precedential value of
the intermediate court's opinion:
"Appellate Divisions and trial courts are at liberty, if they please, to
give such a refusal some measure of significance, as a token, though
indecisive, of the impressions of this court. They are not bound thereby
as an authoritative precedent."
The denial of review by the Supreme Court of Ohio does not
amount to an affirmance of the judgment. It may mean only that
the case was not one of great public or general interest;" and no
40 208 Ill. App. 235 (1917), affd, 283 Il1. 391, 119 N. E. 344 (1918).
41 Rhodes v. Chrysanthou, 191 La. 774, 186 So. 333 (1939).
42 Kroncke v. Caddo Parish School Board, 183 So. 86 (La. App. 1938).
43 252 N. Y. 284, 169 N. E. 386 (1929). The court pointed out the similarity of its
3ractice to that of the Supreme Court of the United States expressed in United States
v. Carver, 260 U. S. 482 (1925), and numerous other cases. Several other state courts
have also noted the similarity of their practice to the federal system.
44 Kern v. Contract Cartage Co., 55 Ohio App. 481, 9 N. E. 2d 869 (1936).
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precedent for the decision of later cases is established by a refusal
to review.4"
In Pennsylvania, the refusal of the appeal "must not be taken
as an indication of any opinion on the merits of the decision, or the
correctness of the application of legal principles in the particular
case."
46
Tennessee occupies a unique position in the effect given to a
denial of review and the practice of the court in writing an opinion
in connection with the denial. In Beard v. Beard47 the Tennessee
Supreme Court described its practice as follows:
"Denial of the writ of certiorari to review the action of the Court of
Appeals, without a written opinion or some explanatory memorandum,
emphasizes the concurrence of the court in the opinion of the Court
of Appeals. Where there is a divergence of opinion or merely concur-
rence in the result reached without approval of the reasoning or authori-
ties in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, a differentiating opinion or
memorandum is filed by this court."
This interpretation of the effect of a denial of review was ques-
tioned in Lingner v. Lingner4s and other opinions, 4" but in two later
cases"' the court has reaffirmed the rule announced in Beard v.
Beard. Under this rule the denial of review without an opinion is
the equivalent of an unqualified refusal in the Texas practice. Only
the opinions of the intermediate court which have thus received
the approval of the court of last resort are published. We have
not had access to the memorandum opinions of the Tennessee Su-
preme Court, which are not published, and consequently we cannot
say whether they are in the nature of the memorandum opinions
contemplated by the proposed amendment to Rule 483. Appar-
,5 Leighton v. Hower Corporation, 149 Ohio St. 72, 77 N. E. 2d 600 (1948).
46 Kraemer v. Guarantee Trust & Safe-Deposit Co., 173 Pa. 416, 419, 33 Ad. 1047,
1048 (1896).
47 158 Tenn. 437, 442, 14 S. W. 2d 745, 747 (1929).
48 165Tenn. 525, 529, 56 S. W. 2d 749, 750 (1933).
49 Bryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 Tenn. 602, 611, 130 S. W. 2d 85, 88 (1939);
Powers v. L. & N. R. Co., 183 Tenn. 526, 528, 194 S. W. 2d 241, 242 (1946).50 Jones v. Mercer Pie Co., 187 Tenn. 322, 331, 214 S. W. 2d 47, 49 (1948) ; Ludlow
v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 218 S. W. 2d 65 (Tenn. 1949).
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ently they are not, since they do not give the intermediate court
opinion a precedential value warranting its publication.
In summary, the practice of the majority of the courts of last
resort in the 12 other states having intermediate appellate systems
encompasses:
1. Decision and announcement of controlling legal principles
(most frequently upon direct appeal) of all cases within certain
categories, corresponding in a general way to cases within sub-
divisions 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article 1728.
2. Announcement of controlling legal principles in all cases of
conflict and (less often) of dissent, corresponding to subdivisions
1 and 2 of Article 1728 and to the Texas Supreme Court's juris-
diction over cases within the "final" jurisdiction of the courts of
civil appeals.
3. Announcement of controlling legal principles in cases de-
cided by the intermediate courts which involve unsettled questions
of great importance to the jurisprudence.
4. No indication as to the correctness of the judgment or of
the holdings in all other cases.
How does the Texas practice agree with this? At the outset we
find that the Supreme Court of Texas possesses no power to take
jurisdiction of a case on the sole ground that it presents a question
of importance to the jurisprudence of the state. If the case falls
within the court's potential writ of error jurisdiction, as a practical
matter the Supreme Court is able to announce the controlling legal
principles, either by an unqualified refusal of the application, or
by granting the application and writing its own opinion (even
where the court of civil appeals judgment is correct but the Su-
preme Court does not agree with the reasoning). Within the scope
of the final jurisdiction of courts of civil appeals the Supreme
Court has no opportunity to pass on questions of importance, on
that ground alone, unless the court of civil appeals wishes to cer-
tify the question to the Supreme Court for determination.
We have remarked that the cases decided by the supreme courts
of other states upon direct appeal correspond roughly to subdivi-
420 [Vol. 4
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sions 3 to 6 of Article 1728. Upon closer examination this state-
ment must be greatly qualified and limited. The bulk of the cases
which reach the Supreme Court of Texas on application for writ
of error fall within subdivision 6 of Article 1728 on the basis of
the amount in controversy. Referring to Table 1, we see that only
four other states make the amount in controversy a jurisdictional
ground for review by the court of last resort. In Alabama, where
the volume of appellate business is much smaller than it is in
Texas, the minimum amount is fixed at $1000, as in Texas. In
Louisiana it is $2000, but personal injury suits are excluded; and
in Missouri it is $7500, more than seven times the minimum in
Texas. In eight of the states the amount in controversy is never of
itself a ground for conferring jurisdiction on the supreme court.
So in comparing the operation of the Texas Supreme Court with
that of other states we should either exclude this group of cases
altogether or make allowance for the disparity in the minimum
amount. Furthermore, we should keep in mind that when measured
by the amount in controversy alone, a case is important only to the
litigants, not to the general jurisprudence. And as we have seen,
the Supreme Court of Texas exercises the function, not exercised
by most other courts, of insuring correct judgments for the benefit
of the litigants in this large body of cases.
In order for our Supreme Court to meet the standard of furnish-
ing authoritative decisions on a comparable plane with the majority
of these other states, we may conclude that it might be expected to
point out correct principles of law on all questions within certain
selected classifications, as under Headings I and II of Table 1.
But these classifications should be re-examined and revised to con-
form to the present needs of our jurisprudence. In the rest of the
cases-including all those where the amount in controversy is the
sole ground for bringing the case within its writ of error jurisdic-
tion-we might ask the court to decide conflicts, settle dissents,
and select cases which in its opinion involve important questions
of law. But, on the contrary, we should not also ask the Supreme
Court to examine the merits of cases under Heading III to deter-
1950]
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mine the correctness of their judgments, as we now do. In short,
if we emphasize the court's function of announcing precedents, we
should relieve it of the duty of inquiring into the correctness of
judgments in cases of no real importance to the jurisprudence.
PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
We have said that the majority of the cases which reach the
Supreme Court of Texas on applications for writ of error fall
within subdivision 6 of Article 1728, on the basis of the amount
involved. This assertion would be difficult to substantiate without
an exhaustive analysis of the applications themselves, and we re-
gret that we have not had an opportunity to make such an analysis.
However, personal observation while connected with the Supreme
Court convinces us that this is true.
It should be borne in mind, of course, that the mere allegation
of the existence of a jurisdictional ground is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction. For example, the Supreme Court does not acquire
jurisdiction of a case merely upon the petitioner's allegation of a
conflict of decision; the court must be of the opinion that a con-
flict actually exists." Also, the fact that some statute is involved
in the proceeding does not necessarily make the case one involving
the construction of a statute necessary to a determination of the
case.
52
In order to arrive at some idea of the number of cases coming
within the first five subdivisions of Article 1728 and within sub-
division 6 on a ground other than the amount in controversy, we
tabulated the court of civil appeals cases reported in 15 recent
volumes of the South Western Reporter in which applications for
writ were filed. We bad to assume that in each application the
assigned errors included these matters. We realize the inadequacy
of this method. It was impossible to know, for instance, in how
51 West Disinfecting Co. v. Trustees of Crosby Ind. Seb. Dist., 135 Tex. 492, 143
S. W. 2d 749 (1940).
52 Ibid.; Mooers v. Hunter, 67 S. W. 2d 860 (Tex. Comm. App. 1934).
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many cases the petitioner made a valid claim of conflict not ex-
pressly disclosed by the court of civil appeals opinion. Whether
the case involved the statutory construction contemplated by sub-
division 3 was also difficult to appraise in some instances. How-
ever, other matters could generally be classified easily enough.
It was found that these cases represented less than a fourth of
the total applications filed. This would indicate that about three-
fourths of the cases reviewed by the Supreme Court upon applica-
tion for writ of error would come within the final jurisdiction of
the intermediate courts of most other states.
From this tabulation we found that in approximately two-thirds
of the cases within subdivisions 1 to 5 the Supreme Court either
granted or unqualifiedly refused the application, and in the other
third the applications were either dismissed or marked "Refused.
No Reversible Error." The percentage of "NRE" cases was con-
siderably higher for subdivision 6.
In cases of revenue or in which the Railroad Commission is a
party, if no new statute or application of legal principles is in-
volved, the jurisprudence is not likely to suffer by the use of the
"NRE" notation. This is also true of cases involving title to prop-
erty and other matters within subdivision 6. Where the principles
involved are already established by prior decision, the "NRE"
notation when properly understood should not cast suspicion upon
the prior holdings. In cases of dissent, conflict, and validity of
statutes, it is not so clear that the "NRE" notation does not hamper
our jurisprudence.
An observation from personal experience might be added in
regard to new or unsettled questions of general interest or im-
portance to the jurisprudence. It was our observation while con-
nected with the Supreme Court that the inclination of the court is
to grant writs of error in cases involving questions of that nature
where it is not in agreement with the reasoning of the court of




COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINIONS AS PRECEDENTS
From what has been said, we believe it is fair to conclude that
the Supreme Court of Texas presently is giving authoritativeness
to as many court of civil appeals opinions as could be expected.
This leads to a consideration of the value of those opinions which
do not have the express approval of the Supreme Court, and the
related question of their publication in the law reports.
The authoritativeness of an intermediate court's opinion de-
pends upon the action taken by the supreme court. Whether its
jurisdiction is final or intermediate, the inferior appellate court
is bound by the decisions of the supreme court, and its opinions
cannot be considered as strictly authoritative unless they are ap-
proved, in some manner, by the highest court. But it is an erro-
neous assumption that an intermediate court opinion which has
not received the express approval of the court of last resort has
no worth in the body of opinion law. In Texas the courts of civil
appeals are primarily responsible for developing the principles of
law applicable, for example, to divorce, contested elections,
slander, venue, and all procedural matters.53
The Supreme Court of Texas may deny a writ of error by either
of the following three notations: "Refused"; "Refused. No Revers-
ible Error"; "Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction." The "Refused"
notation, since 1927, is equivalent to approving the court of civil
appeals opinion in its entirety, so that it attains the dignity of an
opinion of the Supreme Court. 4 We have seen that "Refused. No
Reversible Error" ordinarily amounts to an approval of the judg-
ment without either approving or disapproving the holdings. Where
an application is dismissed, the Supreme Court expresses neither
approval nor disapproval of the judgment or the holdings.55
53 The Supreme Court cannot overturn a decision within the final jurisdiction of
the court of civil appeals simply because it disagrees with the ruling. Harris v. Willson,
122 Tex. 323, 59 S. W. 2d 106 (1933).
54 Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 134 Tex. 377, 383, 110 S. W. 2d 561, 565
(1937).




There is no rule of stare decisis attaching to an unapproved
court of civil appeals opinion which compels another court of civil
appeals to follow it. 6 But it requires no more than a glance at the
reports either of the Supreme Court or of the courts of civil appeals
to see that these opinions are not without value. The Supreme Court
has no hesitancy in citing opinions of the courts of civil appeals
in which no action was applied for in the Supreme Court, or in
which the Supreme Court dismissed the application or marked it
"Refused. No Reversible Error." Undoubtedly these opinions have
a persuasive weight, even though not compelling.
Many lawyers who find dissatisfaction with the "NRE" nota-
tion shun the citation of these cases in briefs and arguments in the
mistaken belief that the opinion is tainted. They say, "There must
be something wrong with the opinion or else the Supreme Court
would have given it an unqualified refusal." They overlook the
fact that ordinarily there must have been a great deal right with
it, or else the Supreme Court would have granted the writ. And,
as we have seen, the "NRE" notation does not necessarily mean
that there was anything whatever in the opinion with which the
Supreme Court could not agree. It may be that the court, being
satisfied as to the correctness of the judgment, did not consider
the questions discussed of sufficient novelty or importance to war-
rant the "fine-tooth comb" treatment essential to an unqualified
approval of an opinion. As Chief Justice Brown once observed, it
requires almost as much work to approve an opinion as to write
it;5' and where the principles involved are neither new nor unset-
tled, it would be defeating the object of courts of civil appeals to
56 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Wood, 211 S. W. 2d 321, 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er ref.
N.R.E.; Hargrave v. Texas & P. R. Co., 12 S. W. 2d 1009, 1010 (Tex. Comm. App.
1929). But cl. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Jackson, 264 S. W. 289, 292 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1924), saying that a court of civil appeals is bound by prior court of civil appeals
decisions, especially one by the same court. In Binford v. Harris County, 261 S. W. 535,
537 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), it was said that a decision of the court of civil appeals in
which writ of error was refused (in 1919, when refusal was equivalent to the present
"NRE") was the law of the state until changed. This statement may.have been based
on the necessity of the correctness of the ruling to the judgment in the case followed.
Also see Orndorff v. El Paso County, 295 S. W. 219, 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) er. ref.
57 See remarks by Chief Justice Brown in 33 Tex. Bar Ass'n Proc. 19 (1914).
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spend too much time in culling every expression in their opinions.
These lawyers apparently do not entertain the same fear for the
"Dismissed" cases, nor do they hesitate to cite opinions in which
the Supreme Court took no action at all. So far as authoritativeness
is concerned, these latter cases are on a parity with the ones which
are dismissed for want of jurisdiction. If any distinction is to be
made, the "NRE" cases should be appreciably higher in the
hierarchy of persuasiveness than either of the other two groups.
PUBLICATION OF COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINIONS
A written opinion serves the dual purpose of informing the
litigants of the basis of the judgment and of announcing principles
for the determination of future litigation. The first purpose is ful.
filled by the delivery of the opinion; but the second purpose is
not fulfilled until the opinion is made accessible to the public
through some practical medium-specifically, through the medium
of publication.
Rule 451 of the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE requires the
courts of civil appeals to "announce in writing their conclusions,"
indicating on its face that the courts of civil appeals shall write
opinions in all cases decided by them. But the precursor of this
rule," in conjunction with the statutory provisions on which Rules
453 and 454 are based, was construed as not requiring the writing
of opinions in cases in which the Supreme Court has no writ of
error jurisdiction, where the court of civil appeals affirms the
judgment of the trial court.59 Rule 452 directs that only brief
memorandum opinions be written where the issues involved have
already been settled by authority or elementary principles of law.
This direction is largely neglected by judges of courts of civil
appeals, mostly because of pressure from losing attorneys, who
want the court to state fully and specifically why they lost their
case.
58 TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. (1925) art. 1876.
59 J. H. Tucker & Co. v. Freiberg & Kahn, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 160, 101 S. W. 837




The trend in recent years has been toward reducing not only the
number of full opinions which are written, but also the volume
of published opinions. This trend was expressed in the provision
of Rule 452, drafted in 1940, that "opinions [of the courts of
civil appeals] shall be ordered not published when they present
no question or application of any rule of law of interest or im-
portance to the jurisprudence of the State." Broadly, this descrip-
tion corresponds to the cases in which the courts of civil appeals
are directed to write memorandum opinions. In 1943 the rule was
amended to require the publication of court of civil appeals opin-
ions where application for writ of error is unqualifiedly refused
or is granted. Even with this enlargement, the rule still seeks to
prevent the publication of opinions not deemed important as
precedents.
The amendment to Rule 452 recommended by the Texas Civil
Judicial Council would add the following significant paragraph:
"When the court has ordered that an opinion shall not be published
such opinion shall be considered as having no precedential value and
shall not be cited or referred to by any court in any other opinion or
memorandum and shall not be cited or referred to by any party in any
proceeding or in any brief. Should this rule be violated in any brief, it
shall be the duty of the court upon attention being called to such viola-
tion to order expunged from such brief all references to such unpub-
lished opinion and if the court finds that such opinion was cited or
referred to with full knowledge that it had been ordered not published,
the court may, in its discretion, strike from the record the entire
brief."6 0
As all Texas lawyers know, there is no official publication of
court of civil appeals opinions, their reporting in the South West-
ern Reporter ordinarily being the only publication given them.
While the enforceability of an order against publication might be
doubtful, the West Publishing Company does not report any opin-
ion which is designated for nonpublication. All the opinions ap-
pearing in the South Western Reporter are published with the
80 See note 11 supra.
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sanction of the court, then, and are in that sense officially pub-
lished.
Under the present rules an unpublished opinion is entitled to
as much consideration as a precedent as is a published opinion.
It has been questioned in some quarters whether a rule adopted by
the Supreme Court prohibiting the citation of opinions whose pub-
lication is not authorized could reduce or nullify their status. As
a practical matter, it is only the opinions in the South Western
Reporter which influence the course of the law, as very few
lawyers ever know of the holdings in the unpublished ones.6 The
Civil Judicial Council's amendment is aimed at checking the pro-
curement of the officially unpublished opinions through private
channels. The Council takes the view that lawyers fortunate enough
to have access to these opinions gain an unfair advantage over
other members of the profession.
Under the present operation of Rule 452 there is no uniformity
in the percentage of unpublished opinions written by the various
courts of civil appeals. A survey for the period from October 1,
1948 to October 1, 1949 showed the average number of unpub-
lished opinions to be 17 per cent, but in the individual courts the
percentages ranged from one per cent to 55 per cent. If we are to
accept the policy now existing under Rule 452, these figures sug-
gest that closer scrutiny should be given to its application. Two
approaches are open. The first is by more thought to whether the
opinion presents any new question; the other is through attention
to the action taken in the case by the Supreme Court.
It must be conceded that it is not always an easy matter to deter-
mine whether an opinion is of interest or importance to the juris-
prudence of the state, and many court of civil appeals judges have
expressed the difficulty they encounter in applying this standard.
Some judges believe that all opinions of the courts of civil appeals
should be published, and that the solution lies in curtailing the
length of opinions rather than the number of ones published. Ob-
61 Letters from the chief justices of the courts of civil appeals in October, 1949,
indicate that the citation of unreported opinions in briefs and arguments is rare.
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viously, resort to memorandum opinions as authorized by Rule
452 would tend toward this result, although it is doubtful that the
publication of memorandum opinions would be of any benefit.
Here, too, the judge runs into the same problem of deciding
whether a full opinion should be written that he does in deciding
whether it should be published. As we have remarked, much of
the difficulty in applying Rule 452 comes from the desire of the
lawyers to have the court write a full opinion in their cases, and
if lawyers were willing to be satisfied with memorandum opinions
the judges would not be so hesitant to take advantage of this pro-
vision. However, lawyers are more likely to be satisfied with hav-
ing an opinion written and not published than with having no
opinion written at all.
The opinion in every case which reaches the Supreme Court
should be evaluated in the light of the action taken by that court.
Dismissal of an application for want of jurisdiction indicates noth-
ing in regard to the merits of the case, and the opinion's publica-
tion value is unaffected by the Supreme Court's action. Likewise,
denial of a motion for leave to file a petition for mandamus to
compel certification" ordinarily does not affect the opinion's pub-
lication value. The jurisdictional ground in these cases must be
either conflict of decision or dissent.6" It might be thought that the
denial would mean that the opinion was not in conflict with any
other opinion, but it actually means only that the relator has not
pointed out a conflict.64
By an amendment to Rule 475 which became effective March 1,
1950, the Supreme Court may deny the petition, although a con-
flict exists, if the opinion of the court of civil appeals under attack
has correctly stated the law. In this event, the rule requires the
Supreme Court to state in its order that it approves the holding of
the court of civil appeals. The holding on that question thereby
receives the express approval of the Supreme Court and the opinion
62 Rule 475, TEX. RULES CIV. PROC.
63 Simpson v. McDonald, 142 Tex. 444, 179 S. W. 2d 239 (1944).
64 Grote v. Price, 139 Tex. 472, 163 S. W. 2d 1059 (1942). Cf. Rule 469, IT (b),
TEX. RULES CIV. PROC.
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should be published, as it not only represents the Supreme Court's
view on the question but serves to overrule another case already
in the law books.
The Supreme Court may also deny a petition for mandamus
where jurisdiction is based on dissent in the court of civil appeals,
if it is of the view that the majority opinion correctly states the
law, "in which event it shall state in its order that it approves the
majority holding."65 The fact that there was a diversity among the
judges indicates that the question was at least doubtful, if not
unsettled, and therefore the approved portion of the majority
opinion is of interest to the jurisprudence of the state. Publication
of the dissenting opinion would also be necessary in order to show
the points of dissent.
Where the Supreme Court grants the mandamus and writes a
full opinion on the question which give rise to its jurisdiction,
there is no occasion for publishing the court of civil appeals opinion
unless it decides, additionally, some new question of law not re-
viewable by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's answer to questions certified to it by a
court of civil appeals is always published as an opinion of the
Supreme Court, and ordinarily publication of the conforming court
of civil appeals opinion is unnecessary.
Rule 452 provides that in every case where application for writ
of error is unqualifiedly refused or is granted, the opinion shall
be ordered published. When an application is granted, the entire
case is then before the Supreme Court on all questions of law
involved.6 This must be qualified by the further statement that
error must be assigned in order for the Supreme Court to have
jurisdiction to decide the point," but it is seldom that neither
party assigns error on a new or unsettled point of law decided by
the court of civil appeals. In other words, ordinarily the only por-
65 Rule 475, TEx. RULES Civ. Psoc., as amended effective March 1, 1950. Petitions
for mandamus on the ground of dissent are infrequent, since these cases are usually
certified under Rules 463 and 465.
"TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1728.
s See note 14 supra.
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tions of the court of civil appeals opinion not before the Supreme
Court represent settled principles of law or involve fact determi-
nations.
Usually the Supreme Court, whether affirming or reversing the
court of civil appeals judgment, embodies in its opinion a full
development of the important principles of law supporting its de-
cision. Where this is true, there is little justification for reporting
the court of civil appeals opinion. In reversed cases the opinion
of the court of civil appeals has no value whatever so far as the
erroneous portions are concerned. In affirmed cases, although the
court of civil appeals opinion may have stated identical rules of
law, it is superseded by the Supreme Court's expression of those
principles. Contrary to the requirement of Rule 452, the sugges-
tion is offered that in the majority of cases where application for
writ of error is granted, publication of the court of civil appeals
opinion serves no useful purpose.
Sometimes the Supreme Court in affirming the court of civil
appeals judgment expressly approves portions of the opinion; or,
though holding differently on some points, it may expressly or
implicitly approve other portions. In these instances publication
would have to be determined on the basis of whether the approved
portion announced a new principle or settled a doubtful question.
If it did, the Supreme Court could avert the need for a separate
publication by simply embodying the approved portion into its
opinion.
Rarely is there need for publishing a court of civil appeals
opinion written after a remand to that court, for it would usually
involve fact questions only. This same policy of nonpublication
should hold, also, where the original opinion decides only fact
issues.'s
68 The preface to the first volume of Tennessee Appeals Reports sets out a lucid
criterion for publication of intermediate court opinions. "No opinion will be published
if the decision is reversed or materially modified by the Supreme Court; or if the
Supreme Court affirms with a written opinion for publication, or a memorandum opinion,
placing its affirmance on different grounds from the opinion of the Court of Appeals;
or if the opinion deals altogether with questions of fact. If an opinion of the Court
of Appeals deals mainly with questions of fact, but also involves some questions of
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The requirement for publication of all opinions in which appli-
cation for writ of error is unqualifiedly refused also seems too
broad. Refusal of an application frequently indicates simply that
the principles involved have already been thoroughly settled, and
the opinion may add nothing to the jurisprudence of the state. 9
Where an application for writ of error is marked "Refused. No
Reversible Error," we have seen that the holdings in the opinion
do not necessarily have either the approval or the disapproval of
the Supreme Court. Its publication, then, should depend entirely
upon whether it presents a question or application of a rule of law
of interest or importance to the jurisdiction of the state.
TIME OF PUBLICATION
If the action taken by the Supreme Court is to be considered in
determining the matter of publication of all court of civil appeals
opinions, final decision on publication would have to be deferred
until the Supreme Court had acted or until time for review had
elapsed.
Speedy publication of opinions which form precedents is desir-
able, of course, but the advantage in publishing court of civil
appeals opinions before possible action on them by the Supreme
Court is slight. Admittedly, it sometimes happens that some other
case in preparation involves the same question of law; but the
instances in which a controlling decision will be rendered just at
the time a like case is pending are fairly rare. Moreover, a case
which is still within the potential jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
law, it is for the Judges to decide whether or not the questions of law are of sufficient
importance and novelty to make it desirable to publish the opinion." 1 Tenn. App.
vii (1926). Beginning with volume 10 of these reports, only opinions approved by the
Supreme Court of Tennessee are published. 10 Tenn. App. vii (1930). See note 47 supra.
69 As an illustration, during the week this paper was drafted the Supreme Court
unqualifiedly refused 9 applications for writ of error. One of the opinions, Howe v.
Howe, 223 S. W. 2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) er. ref., clearly adds nothing to the
jurisprudence of the state. It is extremely doubtful that two others, Wilson v. Barnes,
224 S. W. 2d (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) er. ref., and Mender v. Bryant, 225 S. W. 2d
877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) er. ref., contribute anything new. Another, Louisiana &
A. R. Co. v. Chapin, 225 S. W. 2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) er. ref., has nothing new in
it except possibly on the recovery of funeral expenses in an action for wrongful death,
the propriety of which had already been established by a long line of decisions.
(Vol. 4
PROBLEMS OF PRECEDENT
could not be aptly termed a controlling decision. The advantage of
a few weeks' advance publication certainly does not seem to offset
the disadvantage of placing a valueless case in the permanent
reports.
The current practice of ordering opinions published varies in
the courts of civil appeals. Some courts withhold publication of
all opinions until the Supreme Court has acted on the application
or the time for filing an application has elapsed. Other courts
release them immediately after they are handed down, and they
are published in the South Western Reporter advance sheets as
soon as the motion for rehearing has been overruled or time for
filing the motion has elapsed.
If we are to obtain the maximum effect from Rule 452, it would
be best to withhold all publication until after the time for the
Supreme Court to act. This would entail some inconvenience to the
courts of civil appeals, it is true, for they would have to reconsider
the matter of publication several weeks after the opinion was
adopted. However, the burden would not be enormous. At the time
of preparing the opinion the judge who wrote it could make a nota-
tion whether it should be published, on the assumption that it
would not be overturned in the Supreme Court; or if the whole
court decides which opinions are to be published, the notation
could be added when the opinion is adopted. Beyond that point the
matter of publication could be determined by more or less fixed
rules, and a complete re-examination would not be necessary.
Some court of civil appeals judges think that the Supreme Court
should determine publication in all cases which reach it on appli-
cations for writ of error. This suggestion is a plausible one where
the application is unqualifiedly refused. If the application is dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has no occasion
to weigh the opinion's publication value. In the "NRE" cases the
court of civil appeals is probably in a better position to decide on
publication than is the Supreme Court.
Another possible system, one with manifold and obvious ad-
vantages, would be to have an administrative officer attached to
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the Supreme Court, whose duties would include the release of
opinions for publication. Under such a system the clerks of the
courts of civil appeals would forward to him copies of all opinions,
with the court's recommendation on publication. The administra-
tive officer would then follow up the case in the Supreme Court and
determine under the court's direction which opinions should be
designated for publication in line with standards similar to the
ones outlined above.
PUBLICATION POLICIES IN OTHER STATES
Other states have adopted various policies with respect to the
publication of opinions of their intermediate courts. An Alabama
statute provides that the judges of the court of appeals "shall not
be required to write opinions in cases where the decisions merely
reaffirm previous decisions, or relate to questions of fact only, or
when the case decided would, in their opinion, serve no useful pur-
pose as precedents"; but it further provides that "the title of every
case decided by said courts, and not reported in full, shall be pub-
lished in the reports with brief notes of the points decided or a
statement of the disposition made thereof."70
In California the Supreme Court decides which opinions of the
intermediate courts are to be published. 7' An Illinois statute directs
the intermediate courts to designate for publication in the official
reports only such written decisions "as contain a discussion of a
new or doubtful question of law, or involve the application of rules
of law to a novel state of facts, or decide a new or unsettled ques-
tion of practice."7 All other opinions are published by abstract
or in condensed form.
78
The Indiana intermediate court decides which of its opinions
shall be reported, but no fixed standard is prescribed. It is re-
quired to write an opinion only where a case is reversed.74 In
70 ALA. CODE (1940) tit. 13. § 66.
71 CAL. CONST. Art VI, § 16; CAL. POLIT. CODE (Deering, 1944) § 771.
72 ILL. REV. STAT. (1947) c. 110, § 259.57.
73 ILL. REV. STAT. (1947) c. 37, § 66.
74 IND. STAT. (Baldwin, 1934) §§ 1366, 1391.
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Missouri each court designates the opinions which are to be of-
ficially published "for the benefit of jurisprudence," but there is no
restriction on unofficial publication."
We have observed that in Tennessee the denial of a review with-
out a written opinion by the supreme court amounts to an approval
of the opinion of the intermediate court. Publication of the inter-
mediate court opinions in the South Western Reporter and in the
Tennessee Appeals Reports is confined to those cases in which peti-
tion for certiorari was denied without a written opinion or explana-
tory memorandum.7
6
An Ohio statute allows each intermediate court to select the
cases which shall be published, and provides that "only such cases
as are reported in accordance with the provisions of this section
shall be recognized by and receive the official sanction of any court
within the state. '77 This is the only instance we have found where
a state has expressly undertaken to suppress the citation of unof-
ficially reported cases. It is similar in purpose to the recommenda-
tion of the Texas Civil Judicial Council, and it resulted from the
same kind of situation which the Council seeks to prevent.7 The
Ohio statute has been both criticized and defended by the lawyers.79
It has also been both disregarded"0 and applied" by the courts.
Suppression of the citation of cases whose publication is not
authorized by the court can be argued on both sides. However,
lawyers who do not have access to these opinions may take con-
solation in remembering that the court which delivered the opinion
thought it did not involve a novel situation-that some other case
could be cited just as well.
It is not our intention here to assume the role of advocate for
curtailment of publication. Rule 452 has announced a policy, and
75 Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 2064.
76 See notes 47 and 68 supra.
77 OHIO CODE (1940) § 1483.
78 The historical background of the statute is given in Note, 1 Ohio St. L. J. 135
(1935).
T9 5 Ohio Bar Reports 343 (1932) and 37 Ohio Law Reporter 129 (1932).
80 See Note, 1 Ohio St. L. J. 135 (1935).
81 Bevan v. Century Realty Co., 64 Ohio App. 58, 66, 27 N. E. 2d 777, 780 (1940).
1950]
436 SOUTHWESTERN LAW IOURNAL [Vol. 4
it has been our intention only to suggest ways of implementing it.
While we are in full agreement with the policy, we recognize that
there is among the lawyers and judges of the state another school
of thought, taking the view that all opinions written by the courts
of civil appeals should be published. We have mentioned the dif-
ficulty which some court of civil appeals judges have expressed
in applying the rule, and they are able to cite specific instances
where opinions originally marked not for publication have later
been ordered published by demand from the bar. The problem of
striking a balance between the advantages and disadvantages of
full publication is a knotty one, and is likely to plague us as long
as we preserve our time-honored case law system.
